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Abstract 
This paper explores the ideal basis, qua moral theory, for legal ethics. It 
favours David Luban’s interpretation of Fuller’s theory of natural law.  Luban’s 
theory offers a pragmatic moral standard that is flexible in nature, with the 
primary aim being the protection of human dignity. The advantages of Luban’s 
theory are fleshed out by contrasting it with those of Kant and Mill.  An 
examination of Kant’s Categorical Imperative, and Mill’s Utilitarianism 
illuminates the need for a less rigid moral underpinning of legal ethics. Luban’s 
theory serves as a more convincing moral compass as opposed to a strictly 
prescribed principle. It allows for subjective moral values, autonomy, and 
personal judgement in its overarching pursuit of safeguarding human dignity. 
If there is to be a moral theory as the foundation for legal ethics, it must be 
one that is practical and attainable, whilst allowing for the revision and 
evolution of laws. Luban’s theory does precisely this.  
 
 
Introduction 
In Legal Ethics and Human Dignity, David Luban addresses the perennial 
question of the place of morality in the legal sphere.1 He posits a unique 
interpretation of Fuller’s theory of natural law in order to establish the 
groundwork for legal ethics. By setting a more practical moral standard than 
those posited by Mill and Kant, Luban’s theory proves to offer a superior basis 
for legal ethics. The advantages of Luban’s theory are illuminated when 
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contrasted with the inadequacies of John Stuart Mill’s Utilitarianism and 
Immanuel Kant’s Categorical Imperative. Criticisms of the utilitarian and 
Kantian moral frameworks have highlighted the need for a less rigid moral 
underpinning for legal ethics, such as that offered by Luban. 
 
Utilitarianism 
Utilitarianism is a consequentialist moral theory that measures the morality of 
actions based on their utility and ability to bring about the greatest ‘good’. 
Mill defines the ‘good’ in a hedonistic sense by referring to ‘pleasures’ that 
lead to ‘happiness’. He claims that ‘happiness is a good: that each person’s 
happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a 
good to the aggregate of all persons’.2 In establishing happiness as the 
ultimate good to be achieved, he formulates the utilitarian principle that 
‘actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as 
they tend to produce the reverse of happiness’.3 He further develops the 
objective of happiness by distinguishing between higher and lower forms of 
pleasure. He suggests that forms which involve the exercise of intellect are 
superior to those that derive from sensory pleasures. Utilitarianism is a good 
moral theory prima facie since it directs focus towards the consequences of 
our actions and requires the moral agent to consider the welfare of society. 
However upon further scrutiny, this paper finds rather significant problems 
with this theory that render it untenable, both as a general moral theory and 
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as a basis for legal ethics. One obstacle for utilitarianism pertains to the 
calculation of ‘happiness’. This theory is predicated on the assumption that 
happiness is in fact quantifiable. While it is conceivable that there are varying 
degrees of happiness, the experience of happiness is inherently subjective and 
therefore difficult to measure. Furthermore, this method requires that the 
moral agent be able to accurately predict the outcome of their actions, which 
is not something that one can do with sufficient precision. This presents an 
obvious challenge to the utilitarian principle as it frustrates the method by 
which it is to be applied. In order to conduct a calculation of how to act so as 
to maximise the greatest amount of happiness, one would first need to be 
able to accurately measure the options prior to weighing them out. This 
aspect of Mill’s theory would need to be further developed in order for it to 
be properly applied.  
          Another significant problem with this model is the fact that, as a 
consequentialist theory, it is only concerned with outcomes. Therefore, it is 
possible that one can act in ways that one would consider blatantly immoral 
so long as they achieve an outcome of maximised happiness. According to this 
theory, if the majority is made happier by the action then the action is held to 
be moral. For example, someone could steal from a rich person in order to 
give to several poor people and by the utilitarian standard this act would not 
merely be acceptable, but moral. A more extreme example to consider is that 
of ‘torture television’ where a hypothetical society might enjoy reality TV 
shows that involve torturing innocent people as a means of entertainment.4 
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Here the majority takes pleasure in the televised acts of torture and so the 
principle of utilitarianism is committed to allowing (or even encouraging) it in 
order to promote the maximisation of overall happiness. Thus, while 
utilitarianism is intended to serve as a yardstick to guide moral actions, 
absurdity follows from the logic of this principle where, theoretically, 
happiness can be maximised by acts that are intuitively immoral per se. This 
reductio ad absurdum indicates how utilitarianism is therefore inadequate as 
a moral framework as it permits (and may even require) immoral acts to 
maximise the greater ‘good’.  
            One major requirement of the utilitarian principle of morality is the 
exercise of an extraordinary degree of impartiality. This aspect is problematic 
on two main accounts. Firstly, it imposes unrealistic demands on the 
individual to extract all emotions, influences and biases from the decision-
making process. Secondly, it undermines autonomy by reducing the individual 
to a mere automaton. Mill’s theory takes a purely pragmatic approach in 
moral decision-making so as not to let emotions cloud one’s proper judgment. 
While this may have an initial appeal, it proves to be an extremely high 
standard to impose on humans who are naturally emotional beings with an 
array of preferences and inclinations. Jonathan Riley points out that:  
[utilitarianism] is...overly demanding because it doesn’t recognise ordinary 
moral options to choose suboptimal acts... it denies that individuals have any 
freedom to deviate from their [utilitarian] obligations. An agent is generally 
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obliged to sacrifice even his own life if by doing so he can promote the greater 
good of others.5   
This standard could plausibly lead one to experience inner moral 
conflict if required to divorce one’s emotions from one’s decisions. Consider a 
catastrophic event (fire, flood, or earthquake) where there is a scarcity of 
resources. The principle of utilitarianism requires one to direct one’s efforts to 
rescue as many people as possible, even if this means neglecting to rescue a 
loved one. In this case, the demand of impartiality required by utilitarianism 
defers to numbers of lives rather than any inclination or personal preference 
towards a loved one. Whilst it is noble to want to save as many lives as 
possible, it would be natural to give priority to rescuing a family member over 
several strangers. As Bernard Williams states, ‘such things as deep 
attachments to other persons will express themselves in the world in ways 
which cannot at the same time embody the impartial view’.6  In these 
circumstances, to act according to utilitarianism would severely conflict with 
one’s visceral reactions and natural inclinations. Ultimately, the degree of 
impartiality necessary to adhere to this principle is superhuman and imposes 
an unrealistic standard.  
           The second problem stemming from the impartiality requirement lies in 
its reduction of individuals to automatons and the resulting effect on one’s 
quality of life. This criticism may be attributed to Williams, who asserts that a 
person’s character hinges on her personal projects that help her to define 
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herself.7 Williams stresses the importance of projects stating that ‘[a person] 
wants these things, finds his life bound up with them, and…they propel him 
forward, and thus they give him a reason for living his life’.8 Therefore, it is 
crucial that individuals be partial to their personal projects that give substance 
to their life and provide a sense of self-worth. Notably, ‘differences of 
character give substance to the idea that individuals are not 
intersubstitutable’.9 Williams best summarizes the problem by explaining that: 
a man who has such a ground project will be required by utilitarianism to give 
up in a given case just if that conflicts with what he is required to do as an 
impersonal utility-maximizer when all the causally relevant considerations are 
in. That is quite an absurd requirement.10   
Samuel Scheffler agrees, pointing out that utilitarianism: requires the 
agent to allocate energy and attention to the projects and people he cares 
about most in strict proportion to the value from an impersonal standpoint...it 
is this feature...which may be thought to alienate the agent ‘from his actions 
and the source of his action in his own convictions’, and thereby to undermine 
his integrity.11   
This paper shares those views of Williams and Scheffler, finding that 
utilitarianism requires a degree of impartiality that is too costly for moral 
agents. The impartial standpoint it demands would be detrimental to one’s 
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character, integrity, and overall quality of life. 
 
The Categorical Imperative 
In direct contrast to Mill’s utilitarianism is the deontological moral theory of 
Immanuel Kant. Central to deontological theories are the notions of duty, 
autonomy, and the concept of acts being intrinsically right or wrong. Kant 
strives toward a more objective principle of morality based on what he calls 
the ‘Categorical Imperative’.  The Categorical Imperative requires that moral 
agents ‘act only on that maxim through which you can at the same time will 
that it should become a universal law’.12  For Kant moral judgments ‘are 
governed by...a distinctively practical ideal...[where] the objective correctness 
of a moral judgment is a matter of its affirming a practical principle or maxim 
to which everyone could in some sense consent’.13 For example, it is morally 
wrong to make a false promise, as it cannot be willed to become a universal 
law. The idea is that if everyone were to make a false promise the convention 
of promise-making would collapse since no one would be able to trust any 
promisor. Crucial to Kant’s theory is that individuals always be treated as ends 
in themselves and never as a ‘mere means to an end’.  He believes that it is 
‘good will’ that binds our rational capacity and actions in the world. This 
pertains to another key component of his theory which is that of ‘duty’. Kant 
argues that one is acting morally when one is acting according to duty, where 
one’s acts are governed by rational thought. This notion is intended to 
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counter one acting based on desires that inevitably lack the element of 
control provided by rational deliberation.  
            A fundamental problem with Kant’s theory is that there is no way to 
know precisely what is inherently wrong. It simply states that what is wrong is 
wrong in itself, and that one can determine how to act by employing the 
Categorical Imperative. Yet, it fails to take into account the differing views 
individuals inevitably have, neglecting the fact that ‘people’s tastes may be 
different’.14  The openness to interpretation may lead to the moral 
justification of morally despicable acts. According to the Categorical 
Imperative one may justify an act as moral so long as one can will the act to 
be ‘universalisable’. This can be exemplified by the Jehovah's Witness who 
thinks it is entirely moral to deny a blood transfusion that would otherwise 
save the life of their young child. This controversial act may be morally 
repugnant to many, yet be deemed moral by adhering to the Categorical 
Imperative. Kant is committed to saying that the Jehovah's Witness is acting 
morally qua acting from ‘duty’, and acting in such a way that they would will 
to become a universal maxim. A more worrying example is that of the 
individual with a severely distorted moral conception of revenge. Consider a 
murderer who believes it moral to kill someone as a means of retribution. It is 
conceivable that this murderer believes such an act to be morally justifiable 
and might also will that it become a universal maxim. It seems that Kant 
cannot account for such situations where a person’s deliberation and 
application of the Categorical Imperative leads them to conclude that a 
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manifestly immoral act ought to be a universal maxim. By extending the 
application of the Categorical Imperative to those who may be guided by 
distorted beliefs about retribution, it is evident that this principle will not 
always yield moral actions or decisions. Moreover, it may conceivably have 
the reverse effect; rigid application of the Categorical Imperative to such 
hypothetical contexts reveals how absurd (qua palpably immoral) 
consequences may follow. Hence, this reductio ad absurdum discredits Kant’s 
moral theory by depicting the possible grave repercussions that may derive 
from the vagueness of the Categorical Imperative.  
           Kant’s theory faces another obstacle where it offers no insight when 
there is a conflict of moral duties. Consider a case where one is obligated to 
lie in order to keep a promise. In such a case the moral agent is forced to 
choose but the Categorical Imperative can offer no instruction here. This 
ethical dilemma stemming from a lack of clarity and direction leads to moral 
confusion and feelings of disorientation. Furthermore, in circumstances of 
conflicting moral duties it seems intuitive that one would base one’s decision 
on the predicted outcome of one’s actions.  This appears to trigger a collapse 
into the consequentialist paradigm which deontology seeks to avoid.   
           Part of the confusion which one experiences in situations of conflicting 
duties relates to the rigid nature of deontological moral theories; acts are 
either immoral or moral in and of themselves, regardless of the outcome they 
bring about. This too is problematic where  ‘immoral’ actions may be 
necessary to bring about a ‘moral’ outcome, for example, harbouring a 
fugitive in order to give somebody refuge, knowing that if they were found 
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they would be killed. Kant would be committed to the endorsement of total 
honesty, maintaining that one cannot ever lie or acts of dishonesty would 
become a universal maxim. According to Kant, if it were the case that Nazi 
soldiers were to knock on the door of a household harbouring a Jewish family, 
it would be morally wrong for the person who answers the door to lie and say 
that no Jewish person is residing there. In situations such as these, it seems 
ridiculous to claim that lying to save lives is morally wrong. One’s intuition in 
this case would be to lie in order to preserve the lives of the innocent who are 
potential victims of genocide. According to the Categorical Imperative, to lie in 
these circumstances would be to violate the moral code by lying and by 
treating the Nazi soldiers as other than an end in themselves. In deceiving the 
soldiers, one is transgressing their human right to choice and their freedom to 
make an informed decision to act rightly or wrongly. Despite knowing the 
general motives of the Nazi soldiers, Kant would argue that lying could not be 
justified based on the assumption that they might kill the Jewish family. With 
this example, it is clear that the Categorical Imperative, if followed strictly, 
results in unforgivable consequences that one would intuitively consider 
morally repugnant.  
           What is evident about the moral theories of Mill and Kant is that they 
take an opposite approach in establishing a yardstick for moral action. 
However, this paper suggests that these two theories share one commonality: 
neither of them offers a functional moral theory. That is not to suggest that 
they both ought to be entirely dismissed. One may find that ‘for most of us 
the moral life is an uneasy balance between the utilitarian and Kantian moral 
A Moral Underpinning for Legal Ethics 11 
perspectives’.15 Nevertheless, a close analysis of these theories individually 
reveals that they are over-ambitious and set the moral standard too high to 
be followed. Their rigid nature makes them unrealistic and therefore 
untenable as moral frameworks, and consequently inadequate bases for legal 
ethics. In contrast, this paper will now reconstruct David Luban’s theory and 
argue that it demonstrates merit precisely where those of Mill and Kant fall 
short.  
 
Luban’s Theory 
Luban develops his theory by expanding upon that of natural law theorist, Lon 
Fuller. He interprets Fuller’s theory as ‘the professional ethics of lawmaking’,16 
blending morality into the legal profession by framing it in terms of the 
morality of law-making, as opposed to the morality of the law itself. Luban 
offers an intuitive and cogent argument for the integration of morality into 
the legal profession by referring to the practice of law as an aspiration. He 
asserts that ‘our aspirations have a moral dimension whenever other people’s 
well-being depends on them’.17  With this he endorses Fuller’s theory, which 
he states is not making a conceptual claim about some integral relation 
between legal rules and morality; instead it is simply arguing that ‘lawmaking 
is a profession with a distinctive professional ethics’.18 Luban describes the 
connection that ‘purposive’ and ‘aspirational’ concepts have with morality.  
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According to his theory, ‘legal institutions, although they are entirely human 
creations, have moral properties of their own...[ones] that are connected only 
indirectly to general morality’.19 At the heart of Luban’s morality for legal 
ethics is the notion that ‘what makes the practice of law worthwhile is 
upholding human dignity’.20  By pairing the inherent morality of lawmaking 
with the aim of protecting human dignity, Luban formulates a more 
comprehensive and intuitively compelling moral basis for legal ethics than 
utilitarianism and the Categorical Imperative. 
           Luban’s moral underpinning for legal ethics finds virtue in its realistic 
standard, which has broad enough parameters for one’s subjective morals to 
inform a decision. According to his theory, morality is not some distant and 
objective concept. Rather it is woven into the fabric of our lives via our 
aspirations, which we naturally strive to excel in. The moral foundation for 
legal ethics is not some unattainable standard imposed on lawyers but is 
inherent in the very pursuit of the legal profession. Luban’s theory gives the 
moral agent direction by asserting the overarching objective of all lawyers: 
preservation of human dignity. This requirement is sufficient to steer ethical 
decisions without being overbearing. It gives a sense of morality, without 
being completely prescriptive. Lawyers are granted enough moral breathing 
space so as to exercise their discretion in order to fulfil their duties whilst 
aiming to protect human dignity. Luban acknowledges the role of one’s 
morals by submitting that ‘official ethics rules forbid her from advising the 
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client to break the law even when it is unjust, but ultimately the lawyer’s own 
conscience must be the guide’.21 With this Luban avoids the dangers of 
traditional ‘objective’ moral theories such as ‘[the] moral danger inherent in 
insisting...that it must be possible to bring our lives into focus, and to act 
responsibly, in the absence of any refinements of our own sensibilities or 
modes of response to life’.22 The danger that emerges ‘in adopting this tone of 
insistence...[causing us] to commit ourselves to preserving any prejudices that 
are direct functions of limitations of our sensibilities...[resulting in] a kind of 
moral arrogance’.23  
           The flexibility of Luban’s theory encourages lawyers to have an internal 
value system. It permits them to exercise their judgement as they see fit, as 
long as it aligns with the requirement of safeguarding human dignity. By 
allowing for subjective moral input, Luban preserves autonomy in a way that 
the theories of Mill and Kant do not. Rather than dictating how one must act 
according to some strict principle, Luban’s theory serves as a moral compass. 
Importantly, the flexible nature of Luban’s theory leaves room for the ‘moral 
imagination’ namely, ‘an ability to imaginatively discern various possibilities 
for acting in a given situation and to envision the potential help and harm that 
are likely to result from a given action’.24  Moral imagination is a crucial aspect 
within legal ethics. It is a fundamental mechanism used to break dogmatic 
patterns in order to explore new possibilities. This is precisely what spurs the 
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evolution of laws that are needed to preserve human dignity. One clear 
example of where the moral imagination has been applied and been 
successful is securing women’s right to vote. It took a moral imagination to 
detach from the existing context, to envision a more equal society and then to 
reassess and change the oppressive laws that were in place.   
           Overall, Luban’s theory finds virtue in being practical, by setting an 
attainable moral standard. The unique flexibility of Luban’s theory permits 
subjective moral values to form the content of legal ethics. Notably, these 
values may encompass the use of one’s moral imagination. Despite its broad 
scope allowing lawyers to insert their individual values, Luban makes clear the 
overarching aim towards preserving human dignity. This aim establishes a 
direction for lawyers qua moral agents by giving them a reasonable yardstick 
on which to base their moral decisions. This combination of features is what 
makes his theory the best moral basis for legal ethics. Perhaps the greatest 
feature of Luban’s moral theory, however, is the added benefit of providing 
freedom from dogma and unquestioned tradition, affording greater scope for 
the evolution of laws.  
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